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What is phoenix activity? 
• Phoenix activity is an international phenomenon 
occurring wherever limited liability corporate 
structures exist.  
• A diverse range of conduct may be described as 
phoenix activity. 
• The primary identifiers of illegal phoenix activity are 
a deliberate and often cyclical misuse of the 
corporate form accompanied by a fraudulent 
scheme to evade creditors. 
• Phoenix activity is most often triggered by an 
imminent or actual solvency crisis. 
2 
The mischief of phoenix activity 
• The new company rises like the phoenix from the 
ashes, debt free, to continue the economic 
enterprise of the previous company.  
• Those behind the corporate veil are protected by 
limited liability and the doctrine of the separate 
legal entity from the claims of the previous 
company’s unsatisfied creditors. 
3 
The conundrum of phoenix activity 
• Not all phoenix activity is illegal. Business failure is 
not illegal per se.  
• Legal phoenix activity may take the form of 
legitimate business restructuring that does not 
involve the perpetration of fraud on creditors, nor 
trading in insolvency.  
• The hallmark of legal phoenix activity is honesty. 
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The conundrum of phoenix activity 
• Where the law and regulators seek, quite rightly, to 
move against fraudulent and illegal phoenix 
activity, innocent phoenix activity must not be 
caught in their wake.  
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The conundrum of phoenix activity 
• Robust capitalist economies typically embrace 
financial policy supportive of strong insolvency laws 
tolerant of innocent and well intentioned 
entrepreneurship even when it ends business 
failure. 
• It is implicit in these economies that some 
individuals within the market stand to lose when a 
business fails. 
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The conundrum of phoenix activity 
• Equally, fraudulent and illegal phoenix activity 
ought to be addressed by the law. 
• Would-be perpetrators ought to be clear on what 
behaviour is illegal and the consequences of 
illegality. 
• Enforcement must be swift and effective. 
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The law addressing phoenix activity 
• The following analysis considers well established 
law and a number of reforms introduced to target 
phoenix activity. 
• This law is enforced primarily by three regulatory 
or governmental bodies: 
- Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 
- Australian Securities and Investments 
Commission (ASIC) 
- Fair Work Ombudsman (FWO) 
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The regulators unite 
• These bodies, along with a number of other 
governmental agencies, form the Phoenix 
Taskforce. 
- Australian Taxation Office (ATO) 
- Australian Business Register (ABR) 
- Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) 
- Australian Crime Commission (ACC) 
- Fair Work Ombudsman 
- Australian Federal Police (AFP) 
- Australian  Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) 
- Clean Energy Regulator 
- Department of Employment 
- Department of Environment 
- Department of Human Services 
- Department of Immigration and Border Protection 
- Office of the Migration Agents Registration Authority  
- The State and Territory Revenue Offices 9 
The regulators unite 
• The taskforce, recently emerged from the 
Interagency Phoenix forum, has been 
supercharged by legislation supporting 
interagency sharing of information, and the use 
of sophisticated data matching tools to identify, 
manage and monitor suspected fraudulent 
phoenix operators 
• Tax and Superannuation Laws Amendment 
(2014 Measures No. 3) Regulation 2014 
(Regulation) amends the Taxation Administration 
Regulations 1976. 
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Regulatory approaches to phoenix 
activity 
• ATO - targets fraudulent phoenix activity via  
– fraudulent schemes to avoid taxation and 
– directors penalty scheme 
• FWO - targets illegal phoenix activity via  
– claims for unpaid employee entitlements 
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Regulatory approaches to phoenix 
activity 
• ASIC is responsible for the enforcement of the 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth). Stated enforcement 
targets in relation to phoenix activity include a focus 
upon: 
• cyclical offenders who have managed multiple 
failed companies and  
• gatekeepers such as insolvency and 
restructuring practitioners and legal advisers. 
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Australian Taxation Office 
• A fraudulent scheme to avoid taxation: Income Tax 
Assessment Act (Cth) Part VI A. 
• Security deposits for existing or future tax-related 
liabilities: The Tax Laws Amendment (Transfer of 
Provisions) Act 2010 (Cth) introduced amendments 
making directors personally liable for ‘tax related 
liability’: i.e. all federal tax liabilities. This would 
arguably extend to unremitted income tax, goods 
and services tax and/or unpaid superannuation. 
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Fair Work Ombudsman 
• Workplace relations laws such as the Fair Work Act 
2009 (Cth) are contravened by failure to pay 
employee entitlements, including award wages. 
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ASIC 
• Employees, officers and directors engaged in fraud 
commit an offence: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth),    
s 596 (up to 2 years imprisonment and/or a penalty 
of up to $17,000). 
• Failure to disclose relevant information: 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), ss 475 and 530A. 
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ASIC 
• Asset stripping prior to insolvency may amount to 
an uncommercial transaction: Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth), ss 588FB, 588FC.  
• Director related transactions can also be clawed 
back: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth), s 588FDA.  
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ASIC 
 
• An officer involved in the management of two or 
more insolvent corporations wound up in the 
previous seven years can be disqualified by ASIC 
for up to 5 years: Corporations Act 2001 (Cth),       
s 206F 
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ASIC 
• Breach of fiduciary duty and contravention of 
corresponding statutory duties in Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth), ss 180-184 to act honestly, in good 
faith and in the best interests of the company, avoid 
conflicts of interest and to exercise due care and 
diligence. 
• Duty to avoid insolvent trading: Corporations Act 
2001 (Cth), s 588G. 
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ASIC 
• Duties and contraventions continued:  
- Civil liability v criminal offences. 
- Third party liability could capture the phoenix. 
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ASIC 
• The Assetless Administration Fund is administered 
by ASIC to finance preliminary investigations and 
reports by liquidators into the failure of companies 
with few or no assets.  
• The AA Fund is a key plank in ASIC’s strategy to 
curb phoenix activity. 
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ASIC 
• ASIC has discretionary power to wind up 
abandoned companies, Corporations Act 2001 
(Cth), s489EA. 
• Introduced by the Corporations Amendment 
(Phoenixing and Other Measures) Act 2012 (Cth) 
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Languishing reforms 
• Further amendment to the law was proposed. This 
law was directed at cyclical phoenix activity where 
the new or related company had a similar name to 
the previous company: Corporations Amendment 
(Similar Names) Bill 2012 (Cth). 
• The Bill lapsed upon the dissolution of parliament 
for the last federal election: Would it be effective in 
any event? 
22 
Languishing reforms 
• Gazal case study 
- Banned for 5 years for: 
- failure to maintain adequate financial 
records 
- falsification of financial records  
- falsification of business activity statements 
and  
- failure to assist liquidators in winding up. 
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Languishing reforms 
• Gazal case study 
• Six failed companies:  
• Gazal Leisure Pty Ltd 
• Viscount Manufacturing Pty Ltd 
• Vehicle Assembly Australia Pty Ltd 
• Mirage Caravan Manufacturing Pty Ltd 
• Goldstream Caravan Manufacturing Pty Ltd 
• Gazal Caravans Pty Ltd 
• All six companies manufactured ‘Viscount 
Caravans’ 
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Languishing reforms 
• Gazal case study 
 
‘Mr Gazal’s lack of commercial morality resulted in 
a substantial loss to creditors which is why we’ve 
imposed the maximum disqualification penalty’. 
 
Greg Tanzer, Executive Director of Consumer 
Protection, ASIC. 
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Conclusions 
• There is a body of existing law well placed to 
address fraudulent or otherwise illegal conduct 
falling within the spectrum of illegal phoenix activity. 
• This law needs only to be enforced.  
• The detection and enforcement burden is 
considerable. Regulators face shrinking budgets 
and are rapidly losing feet on the ground.  
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Conclusions 
• Further law reform targeting illegal phoenix activity 
should only be implemented after a consideration 
of the broader economic impact of legal and 
regulatory change.  
• Companies are economic entities that exist in an 
economic context.  
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Conclusions 
If through future reform we seek to limit or discourage 
corporate behaviour then we must consider the 
underlying context in which that behaviour occurs and 
that includes the economic purpose served by 
companies.  
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Conclusions - in the absence of fraud 
Legal corporate activity, albeit legal phoenix activity, 
ought to be tolerated by the law and supported by 
financial policy. It should not result in holding 
directors personally liable for the debts of the 
company. 
 
In the absence of fraud, the law rarely tolerates 
piercing the corporate veil. There has been some 
reticence to piercing the corporate veil in the absence 
of fraud. The reasons underlying that reticence 
include important economic considerations.  
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Conclusions - in the presence of 
fraud 
• Fraudsters ought fully expect the law to rain down 
upon them.  
• Deterrence theory underlies much of the penalty 
regime in Australia for failures in corporate 
governance. 
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Conclusions - in the presence of 
fraud 
• Deterrence theory suggests that if the law is to be 
an effective deterrent it must be clearly articulated, 
with penalties commensurate with the 
harm/seriousness of the offence and enforcement 
must be swift and forthcoming.  
 
• Deterrence theory supports the existing law 
addressing illegal phoenix activity and emphasises 
the critical role of effective regulatory action. 
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